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In Shirer v. O.W.S. & Associates' the issue presented for the
court's consideration concerned the area of offer and acceptance.
The facts showed that Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.,
the appellant here and the defendant below, pursuant to loan
negotiations, presented an offer to the plaintiff on December 6,
1966. The plaintiff replied with a conditional acceptance of
the offer along with its check for a "liquidated damage de-
posit."2 Thereafter, on January 31, 1967, the plaintiff com-
municated to Jefferson that it sought to terminate any and all
preliminary agreements and requested return of its deposit. Re-
lying on these facts, the court affirmed the finding of the trial
court holding plaintiff's conditional acceptance to be a mere
counter offer8 which was never accepted by Jefferson prior
to the plaintiff's withdrawal.
4
Tidewater Supply Clo. v. Industrial Electric (o.r was an
action brought by Tidewater for the value of goods furnished
to the subcontractor, Industrial Electric Co., which were sub-
sequently used in construction work of the general contractor,
Eskridge & Long Construction Co. Tidewater sought recovery
from botA Industrial and Eskridge. The trial court overruled
Eskridge's demurrer, and this appeal resulted.
On appeal Eskridge asserted that the complaint( did not
state a cause of action since it did not sufficiently set out a
1. 253 S.C. 232, 169 S.E.2d 621 (1969).
2. At the trial neither party contested the validity of the provision for
liquidated damages.
3. It is a basic requirement that acceptance be positive and unambiguous.
Where it is qualified or conditional or introduces a new term, it amounts to
no more than a counter offer. Sossamon v. Littlejohn, 241 S.C. 478, 129
S.E.2d 124 (1963). Even more basic is the requirement that a contract be
the result of a definitive offer and acceptance. Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199
S.C. 5, 18 S.E2d 584 (1942).
4. The only significant question presented by this case was the exclusion
from evidence of a carbon copy of an alleged acceptance made by Jefferson on
December 22, 1966.
5. 253 S.C. 483, 171 S.E2d 607 (1969).
6. The only portion of the complaint involving Eskridge was paragraph
five. It stated "[tihat Eskridge & Long Construction Co.... has received
the benefit of the goods, wares and merchandise ... which goods were in-
corporated into and are a part of the Construction work performed ...."
Record at 3, Tidewater Supply Co. v. Industrial Electric Co., 253 S.C. 483,
171 S.E.2d 607 (1969).
1
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contractual relationship. The supreme court noted that in an
action for damages for breach of contract the plaintiff must,
of necessity, in his complaint allege that a contract was formed
and breached in order to recover.7 Despite Tidewater's reliance
on several other theories,8 the supreme court ruled that the mere
fact that Eskridge "received a benefit" from the plaintiff's ac-
tions was not sufficient to form a contractual relationship,
express or implied, and so reversed the lower court's judgment.9
II. SECuED PAxTx's RIGHTS ON DIsPosmoN oF CowATxA
The comparative rights of a secured party and a subsequent
purchaser of collateral were considered in Stephenson Finance
Go. v. Bruoe.10 The case was a claim and delivery action1 ' for
the value of thirteen automobiles.
Prior to September 13, 1966, Bruce, a South Carolina partner-
ship, had conducted a number of transactions with a third
party, Richmond Motor Sales of Georgia, a Georgia partnership.
The sale to Richmond of the thirteen vehicles in question was
among these prior transactions. Richmond made payments by
check to Bruce at varying intervals following its purchases.
After the sale and delivery of the automobiles along with the
delivery of all indicia of ownership to Richmond, "floor plan"
financing was obtained from Stephenson Finance Co., a
Georgia corporation. Richmond surrendered all indicia of
ownership to Stephenson. Security agreements were executed
by Richmond to Stephenson, and these were properly filed and
perfected under Section 940212 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (hereinafter UCC). Richmond later became insolvent
and sought to convey the automobiles back to Bruce in exchange
7. Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E2d 845
(1964) ; Wharton v. Tolbert, 84 S.C. 197, 65 S.E. 1056 (1909).
8. See Brief for Respondent at 5-9, where Tidewater asserts theories
based on express contract, unjust enrichment, third party beneficiary contract,
and agency to support recovery.
9. See also Smith v. Hurley-Mason Co., 67 Wash. 683, 122 P. 361 (1912)
which held that no implied contract was formed merely because a contractor
used material sold to a subcontractor.
10. 174 S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1970).
11. The cause was referred to the master in equity rather than a jury,
apparently by consent, since a claim and delivery action is an action at law.
Middleton v. Robinson, 202 S.C. 418, 25 S.E.2d 474 (1943).
12. It is agreed that under the facts UCC § 9-103 would require application
of Georgia law, but the applicable sections are identical in both states. G..
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for two cheeks'3 which Richmond had originally offered as
payment to Bruce. The transaction was consummated, although
the only indicia of ownership given to Bruce was the bill of
sale.
Bruce's defense to the secured party's claim, that it was a
bona fide purchaser and thereby protected, was unsuccessful in
the lower court.14 This resulted in Bruce's relying on UCC
section 9-306(2) 15 on appeal, whereby Bruce sought to show
that Stephenson had impliedly authorized the questioned sale
because of the very nature of "floor plan" financing. After
discussing the propriety of Bruce's raising this new defense' 6
and expressing hesitancy at construing the statute of another
state, the court affirmed the master's ruling in favor of
Stephenson, the secured party. The court stated that, since the
master's ruling was based on findings of fact,'7 it was not
subject to appellate redetermination so long as there was ample
evidence to sustain his ruling.
It can only be surmised what the outcome might have been
had the defendant been an ordinary consumer purchaser of a
single automobile or household appliance -both of which are
13. One of the checks had never been negotiated while the other had
repeatedly been presented but never paid because of lack of sufficient funds.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-307(1) (Supp. 1966) provides that "[a] buyer
in ordinary course of business . . .takes free of a security interest created
by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though
the buyer knows of its existence" (emphasis added). S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-201(9) (Supp. 1966) further states:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind . . . . "Buying" . . . does not
include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial
satisfaction of a money debt
Considering the facts, the master ruled that Bruce was not a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" and thus could not claim relief under the above
statute.
15. "[A] security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale..
by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the
security agreement or otherwise .... " S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-306(2) (Supp.
1966).
16. The court stated that it was at best "doubtful" whether the issue had
been properly presented as there was no mention of UCC § 9-306(2) in the
defendant's pleadings, the master's report, or the defendant's exceptions.
17. The Master stated, "I further find as a fact that Bruce did not buy
the vehicles in the ordinary course of business or on any other valid basis
.... I further find as a fact that from all of the facts and surrounding
circumstances there was no authorization by Stephenson to Richmond for
such transfer of the thirteen vehicles to Bruce . . . ." 174 S.E2d at 752.
3
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commonly "floor planned." Existing, pre-UCC, case law s
would seem to favor recovery by such a purchaser, as would
UCC section 9-306(2) if a liberal interpretation of "consent"
is adopted. Certainly, when goods have been "floor planned,"
an implied authorization for future sale has been made, as this
is the sole desired result of the arrangement. Even with such
implied authorization, the purchaser would still be required to
show his "good faith"'19 in order to establish a right paramount
to that of the secured party. This would present no problem to
the typical consumer who buys without any knowledge of the
retailer's financing arrangements and pays the designated price
to one whom he thinks is the true owner.
Ill. FAILuE OF CONDITION
In QuaZity Concrete Products, Inc. v. C.Y. Thomaso 2  the
plaintiff, a subcontractor, brought an action to recover on two
alleged construction contracts. 21 Certain defects developed in
the work covered by the second contract. These defects were
admitted by Quality in a letter to Thomason.22 Thomason con-
tended that the admission of the defects amounted to an aban-
donment of the contract by Quality which permitted Thomason
to make its own corrections. Thus, when suit was brought, the
cost of these corrections was claimed as a set-off of $6,668.80.
After mutual agreement to certain "back charges" and reduc-
tions by and between the parties, the trial judge found that
Quality was entitled to a minimum recovery of $3,530.90 up-
wards to a maximum of $10,199.70. Thomason consented to the
maximum amount, but sought to have it reduced by the alleged
18. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Young, 239 S.C. 250, 122 S.E.2d
640 (1961) and Atlas Finance Co. v. Credit Co., 216 S.C. 151, 57 S.E.2d 65
(1950). See also Cudd v. Rogers, 111 S.C. 507, 98 S.E. 796 (1919) where
the court held that, when a mortgagee impliedly consents to the sale of
mortgaged property, he waives his lien of the mortgage.
19. The drafters of the Code made "good faith" an integral requirement as
evidenced by UCC §§ 1-203 and 2-103(b), which goes even further and
requires a higher standard for a merchant. The common law rule against
fraudulent conveyances found in S.C. CODE AwN. § 57-301 (1962) requires
both sufficiency of consideration and a bona fide intent of the parties.
20. 253 S.C. 579, 172 S.E.2d 297 (1970).
21. Each was for a portion of the precast concrete work on Thomason's
job with the former being written and the latter, oral.
22. In the letter the president of Quality stated that he regretted the
defects and would attempt to rectify them. He authorized the corrective
work discussed in a previous conversation with Thomason. Evidence indi-
cated that the conversation provided for the corrective work to be done by
a designated third party and for Quality to be informed of its cost
[Vol. 2
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/2
CONTRACTS SURVE=
set-off. Judgment was rendered below, however, for the maxi-
mum amount.
23
On appeal the court, considering the propriety of the de-
fendant's set-off claim, stated:
The abandonment of a contract is a matter of intention
to be ascertained from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction from which the abandon-
ment is claimed to have resulted. An abandonment of a
contract need not be express but may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties and the attendant circum-
stances.
24
Thus, the disposition of the appellant's set-off claim was held
properly determined by the jury as a faotuaZ issue. Also, the
appellant's claim that the trial judge should have charged the
jury that Quality had abandoned its contract was ruled to be
without merit, since such a charge would have unjustly removed
a factual issue from the jury.25
IV. RE m.s :FOR BimcH
Three cases involving the various remedies for breach of
contract arose during this survey period. Graven v. Williams 26
was an action for specific performance of an alleged contract for
the sale of real property. On October 2, 1963, the plaintiff wrote
the defendant and inquired as to the possibility of purchasing
her land.27 Several exchanges by mail subsequently took place;
and on August 4, 1964, the defendant wrote the plaintiff and
concluded her letter: "I am asking $150.00 per acre and will
take back 1st Mort at 6% monthly or quarterly payments and
my Lawyer will draw up Contract [sic]." 28 Two days later the
23. The above letter was the only evidence offered by Thomason to show
Quality's abandonment. Testimony was given by both sides indicating that
Quality itself did certain corrective work after the letter.
24. 253 S.C. 579, 589, 172 S.E2d 297, 302 (1970).
25. Where contrary evidence exists, such a charge would be improper.
Hendricks v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 247 S.C. 479, 148 S.E2d 162
(1966).
26. 302 F. Supp. 885 (D.S.C. 1969).
27. Plaintiff was an attorney who resided in the area where the land in
question was located. Defendant was a 72 year old woman (a college
graduate) who had lived in New York most of her later life and returned
only occasionally to South Carolina. During the 1950's she had been institu-
tiohalized in a mental hospital for eight years, but was subsequently released
and restored to legal capacity. At the time of the negotiations she had neither
visited the property for several years nor consulted anyone regarding its
value.
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plaintiff replied that he "accept[ed] [her] offer of the sale of
your [her] land as stated in your letter of August 4th, 1964, for
the amount of $150.00 per acre. Please have your lawyer draw
the contract." 29 He then added, "[H]owever, you did not 8et
out the amount of down payment, if any."380 Plaintiff contended
that these two letters constituted a contract for the sale of the
defendant's land. More correspondence followed with the plain-
tiff threatening suit unless a completed contract of sale was
forwarded. Finally, on August 23, 1965, after conversing with
the defendanb by telephone, the plaintiff wrote the defendant's
New York attorney and claimed that an agreement had been
reached. The price per acre remained at $150.00 per acre, but
the plaintiff was now to receive only a quitclaim deed. No reply
was made to this letter nor to a subsequent inquiry made two
months later, whereupon this suit for specific performance
followed.
In deciding that specific performance should not be granted,
the court noted that it is settled law in South Carolina that a
valid contract can be made by exchange of correspondence, so
long as the correspondence expresses the true intent of both
parties and such exchanges are not merely preliminary negotia-
tions.3' The court acknowledged that invalidation of a contract
for indefiniteness is usually not favored; however, in those
cases where specific performance is sought, a more exacting
degree of definiteness is required.32 The court could conceivably
have stopped at this point and decided the case' on the basis
of whether the parties had intended their dealings to be final
and, if so, whether the terms were sufficiently definite 3 The
court went on, however, to discuss ad of the factors to be con-
sidered in granting specific performance.34 In addition to
indefiniteness of terms the court, in deciding that specific per-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 302 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D.S.C. 1969), citing Holiday v. Pegram, 89
S.C. 73, 71 S.E. 367 (1911).
32. 302 F. Supp. 885, 891 (D.S.C. 1969), citing White v. Felkel, 222 S.C.
313, 72 S.E.2d 531 (1952).
33. The facts seem to favor a conclusion that the letters constituted only
preliminary negotiations. If final agreement had truly been reached, why
would the plaintiff, an attorney, continually try to pin down a specified
down payment and also demand a written contract? Also consider, why would
he settle for a quitclaim deed at the same price if a contract had already
been formed?
34. See Adams v. Willis, 225 S.C. 518, 83 S.E2d 171 (1954) which held
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formance should not be granted, considered the relative posi-
tions of the parties, 5 the adequacy of the consideration, 6 and
the greater discretion permitted the court in this area.
7
The second case in this area was Hryd ick v. Mehlmans, In,. 8
which involved the remedies available in a breach of warranty
action. The trial judge charged that the measure of damages
"would be the differences in the actual value of the stereo in its
defective condition at the time of sale and its value if it had
been as warranted.13 9 This value could vary from zero to $595,
which was the original purchase price. The jury found for the
plaintiff in the sum of $595, after which the defendant made
a motion for the return of the stereo. The motion was granted
by the trial judge, and the plaintiff appealed.
It has generally been held in South Carolina that in a breach
of warranty action a purchaser of personalty can elect either to
return the item and demand refund of the purchase price
(rescission) or to retain the item and demand damages. 40 The
court found that no election for rescission had been made by
the plaintiff in this instance, since there was no mention of
rescission and the basic character of the action was legal. The
only factor relied on by the respondent was one statement in the
appellant's original complaint: "Plaintiff herewith tenders to
both Defendants, or either of them, the said machine."41 In
spite of this the court stated: "We do not think such an
allegation makes the action one for recision [sic] in the light of
the entire complaint, the answers and the charge of the law by
the judge."42 On this basis the trial court's order to return
was reversed.
35. The plaintiff was a local attorney while the defendant was an elderly
lady who had once been declared mentally incompetent and resided a great
distance from the disputed property.
36. The court found the minimum value of the land to be $450 per acre.
See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E2d 372 (1942)
where it was stated:
When the accompanying incidents are inequitable and show bad
faith, such as concealment . . . weakness of mnind, sickness, old
age, . . . these circumstances combined with inadequacy of price,
may easily induce a court to grant relief ....
Id. at 442, 23 S.E2d at 378 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. 172 S.E.2d 824 (S.C. 1970).
39. Id. at 826.
40. Ebner v. Haverty Furniture Co., 128 S.C. 151, 122 S.E. 578 (1924). The
provisions of the UCC were not considered by the court as the initial trans-
action took place prior to the enactment of the UCC by South Carolina.
41. Record at 6, Hydrick v. Mehlmans, Inc., 172 S.E2d 824 (S.C. 1970).
42. 172" S.E2d 824, 826 (S.C. 1970). Rescission was hardly the proper
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The third and last of the cases dealing with remedies was
Sheppard v. Nienow.43  This was an action brought by the
plaintiff-tenant on behalf of her child for injuries sustained
because of the defendant-landlord's alleged breach of a covenant
to repair.44 The jury found for the plaintiff, and this appeal
followed. In reversing, the supreme court stated that the
general rule in South Carolina is that a covenant to repair by a
landlord gives rise to a cause of action only for the cost of
such repairs and not for any resulting personal injuries. 45 Thus,
it followed that the child had no contractual cause of action if
the parent-tenant did not. The court further stated:
Since the injury to the respondent was incurred on
premises in the exclusive possession and control of the
tenant, the landlord was not liable in tort under the
law applicable to this relationship.46
After finding no cause of action under either theory, the court
concluded that the defendant's request for a directed verdict
should have been granted.
It is significant to note that the court here declined to change
South Carolina case law in this area in spite of the growing
minority view and the rather close factual circumstances. 4 In
an increasing number of jurisdictions the older doctrines which
have traditionally protected the landlord have given way to the
more modern concepts of social policy which impose, liability
on the landlord-the more financially able party. Several states
and municipalities have accomplished this by statute.48 The
action being brought Undoubtedly, the defendant favored an action for
damages and made no objection to the trial judge's charge since he expected
a lesser judgment. If he was then dissatisfied with the verdict, he should
have moved for a new trial nisi.
43. 173 S.E2d 343 (S.C. 1970).
44. Plaintiff rented a trailer and a lot from the defendant. The covenant
to repair was allegedly formed when the defendant promised to replace certain
burned out exterior lights and to remove metal stakes from the plaintiff's
lot. The plaintiff asserted that failure to perform this promise caused the
accident wherein her child was injured.
45. Sheppard v. Nienow, 173 S.E2d 343 (S.C. 1970), cithing Conner v.
Farmers and Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 SYE2d 385 (1963) and
Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329
(1932). This is still the majority rule as recognized in the United States.
See gencrall.v Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238 (1961).
46. 173 S.E.2d 343, 345 (S.C. 1970).
47. The plaintiff had called the defect to the defendant's attention;,it seems
questionable to find the lights "solely in plaintiffs control" merely because she
had agreed to pay the electric bill for them.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts9 also favors this minority posi-
tion.
V. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Daniels v. Colena was a combined trespass and fraud ac-
tion in which the plaintiffs recovered in both areas below; the
defendant thereafter appealed. The basis of the controversy
involved the true ownership of certain realty. On October 26,
1964, L.L. Rogers, by written instrument, conveyed this realty
- his farm, worth an estimated $75,000 - $100,000- to his
daughter and her husband, the plaintiffs here, for five dollars
and "love and affection." The farm was subject to a $40,000
lien in which the defendant had an interest. Then, according
to the defendant, the plaintiffs orally reconveyed the farm to
Rogers in the form of either a life estate or an estate at will.
Rogers and his wife continued to reside on the farm after the
written conveyance and were in physical possession at the time
of the alleged trespass by the defendant, who had come upon
the land to collect a disputed .debt.
Answering the charge of trespass, the appellant denied that
his actions amounted to a trespass and contended that Rogers,
rather than the plaintiffs, should have been the one to bring
such an action. This contention was countered by the plaintiffs
who sought to employ the Statute of Frauds to show that there
had been no effective oral reconveyance to Rogers. While hold-
ing that there was, in fact, no trespass, the court stated: "Since
there has been full performance by L.L. Rogers, the Statute of
Frauds has no application." 51 The facts as previously given
concerning the oral reconveyance were substantially admitted in
open testimony at the trial by one of the plaintiffs.r2 The
court's statement would thus not seem to conflict with existing
case law, so long as the performance was full and complete.5 3
However, mere physical possession without more, as here, has
not previously been considered to be full performance. At best,
in certain partition cases, it has been held merely a sufficient
element of part performance to preclude the use of the Statute
49. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965).
50. 253 S.C. 218, 169 S.E.2d 593 (1969).
51. Id. at 231, 169 S.E.2d at 599 (emphasis added).
52. Record at 149, Daniels v. Coleman, 253 S.C. 218, 169 S.E2d 593 (1969).
Were this an action dealing with the sale of goods, such admission in court
would itself prevent the plaintiff from pleading the Statute of Frauds. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 102-201(3) (b) (Supp. 1966).
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of Frauds as a defense." The broad interpretation implicit in
the court's statement would thus seem to mark a departure from
prior case law; but its value as precedent must be viewed cir-
cumspectly, since the court's statement was only dictum.
VI. Co sTRuoON OF CONTRACTS
In American Motorists Insurance Go. v. Murphy5 5 the plain-
tiff appealed, after the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for a non-suit. The dispute concerned the interpretation
to be given certain parts of a written agency agreement58 be-
tween the plaintiff, an insurance company, and the defendant,
an individual agent. 'Upon termination of the agency agree-
ment, the insurance company sought payment of subsequent
premiums on policies sold by the agent. No evidence was
presented which indicated that the agent actually collected any
of the disputed premiums or that he prevented the insurance
company from collecting them.
The court found that the title to any unpaid premiums was
specifically reserved in the insurance company and that there
was no provision in the agreement which gave the defendant
the right to collect the premiums after termination of the agree-
ment. "In the absence of a right to collect the premiums which
accrued after the termination of the agency, defendant could
not be held liable for their payment."57 The court refused to
consider another portion of the agency agreement5" which al-
legedly directly concerned the collection of the disputed pre-
miums, since it determined that this portion had not properly
been presented as evidence. This clause, which apparently
required the agent to collect all subsequent premiums, was con-
54. See Wilson v. Cooper, 226 S.C. 538, 86 S.E2d 59 (1955) and Carson
v. Coleman, 208 S.C. 406, 38 S.E.2d 147 (1945). See also Hollowoa v. Buck,
174 Ark. 497, 296 S.W. 74 (1927) which held that possession under a parol
family settlement was sufficient part performance to remove it from the
Statute of Frauds.
55. 253 S.C. 346, 170 S.E.2d 663 (1969).
56. One clause stated: "Agent shall pay company . .. all premiums arising
out of insurance written under this agreement, whether or not collected by
agent . .. ." Id. at 348, 170 S.E.2d at 664.
57. Id. at 349, 170 S.E.2d at 665.
58. The following clause was set out in Appellant's Brief at 4:
After notice of suspension, revocation or termination of the said
authority of the Agent or of cancellation or termination of this
agreement, the Agent shall complete the collection and account to
the company for all premiums ....
Vol1. 2
10
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sidered by the lower court, but was struck as violative of public
policy.
9
Lyerly v. Evans6" involved a conveyance of property rights
by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserted that
the conveyance was a valid 99 year lease of the three acres in
question, while the defendant contended that it was merely a
transfer of his (the defendant's) tobacco allotments. The trial
court, finding for the defendant, held that the instrument,
regardless of its appearance, had been intended merely as a trans-
fer of the tobacco allotments. It reached such a holding by
admitting oral testimony, over plaintiff's objections, on the
premise that such was competent to show the purpose of the
writing.6 ' The supreme court affirmed the lower court's finding
for the defendant. It, too, admitted the disputed testimony, but
only after finding that an ambiguity existed in the agreement.
6 2
Once such an ambiguity was found, the court was free to look
not only at the written language, but also outside it to the
surrounding circumstances in order to determine the true agree-
ment made by the parties.
63
JAmES D. MYEms
59. The trial court considered this clause in making, its decision but struck
it as violative of public policy, since it required the defendant to perform acts
prohibited by statutes. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-231, 37-245(1) (1962).
The trial court recognized that such statutes were legislated for the pro-
tection of policy holders rather than agents but concluded: "I believe the
contract in that regard would be void and against public policy." Record at 29,
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 253 S.C. 346, 170 S.F_2d 663 (1969).
60. 172 S.E.2d 555 (S.C. 1970).
61. By admitting the testimony, the lower court apparently gave recognition
to an exception to the parol evidence rule which had previously not been con-
sidered in South Carolina. See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 1015 (1964).
62. While one portion of the instrument evidently referred to itself as a
general 99 year lease, another specified that the intention of the parties was
merely to give the plaintiff the tobacco allotments. The plaintiff's actions
from 1960 to 1963 would appear to support the latter interpretation, since
during this period he utilized the allotments on his own land.
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